

CITIZEN'S REPORT

on the financial management of
government's covid-19 initiatives




AUDITOR - GENERAL
SOUTH AFRICA

Auditing to build public confidence

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A U D I T O R - G E N E R A L
S O U T H A F R I C A

This citizen's report is dedicated to the late Kimi Makwetu, auditor-general of South Africa from 1 December 2013 to 11 November 2020. His seven-year term was due to come to an end on 30 November 2020; but he sadly passed away before then.



In memory of
Thembekile Kimi Makwetu
7 January 1966 – 11 November 2020



Dear fellow citizen

When the covid-19 pandemic reached South Africa in March 2020, government moved swiftly to provide social, health and economic relief for vulnerable citizens and businesses. A multi-billion rand emergency relief package was made available, to be spent urgently, using fast-tracked processes.

Aware that this approach could save lives and livelihoods but expose public resources to the risk of misuse and abuse, government requested the Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) to assist. We were given the task of monitoring the spending of government departments and agencies involved with covid-19 relief initiatives.

We began our audit work in May 2020 and released our first special report on the financial management of government's covid-19 initiatives in early September 2020, with a second special report following in December 2020. The tabling of the final special report in our covid-19 series is projected for 30 June 2021.

Our real-time auditing means that we are able to 'follow the money' as it is spent and report any audit findings and observations to the accounting officers or authorities concerned so that they can respond to shortcomings immediately.

In this citizen's report, we summarise our key audit findings so far and explain what action has been taken in response to our findings. We also explain the next phase of our ongoing audit of government's covid-19 initiatives, and outline what needs to be done in the longer term to ensure that public money is spent accountably – whether in a pandemic or under 'normal' circumstances.

The active engagement of citizens in holding government to account is an important element of a well-functioning democracy. At the end of this report, we suggest some things you, as a South African citizen, can consider in ensuring that public resources are spent in the best interests of the people of South Africa.

Yours sincerely

The AGSA's communication team

A UNIQUE AUDIT FOR UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES

In times of crisis, the agility and robustness of public finance management systems are truly tested. When governments refocus controls or processes to respond to a crisis, they may unintentionally create opportunities for the abuse or misuse of public resources.

The covid-19 pandemic has been an unprecedented crisis for South Africa and almost every other country in the world.

In response to the pandemic, the South African government announced a **R500 billion fiscal support package** in March 2020 to deal with the health crisis and its socio-economic consequences.

R270 billion of this was for tax relief and credit guarantees for bank loans for businesses in distress, meaning that it would not be paid out directly but would still come at a cost to the national fiscus.

The remaining **R230 billion** was for various forms of relief for individuals, households and businesses.

However, this multi-billion-rand relief package was being injected into an environment that was already compromised due to internal control weaknesses, as highlighted in our previous reports.

Accountability is essential in a crisis

Long before the pandemic broke out, we had been reporting on and warning about poor public sector financial management controls, disregard for supply chain management legislation, an inability to manage projects effectively, and a lack of accountability.

Our warnings had to do with many of the government sectors that needed to lead or support government's efforts to manage its response to the pandemic: local government, health, water and public works are some of them.

Even in the middle of a crisis of this magnitude, transparency and accountability for government spending cannot take a back seat. With the support of the President of South Africa, we have since May 2020 been auditing the various covid-19 initiatives introduced by government and, as we proceed, have been issuing reports on our findings and observations.

This is what we call a real-time audit; instead of waiting as we usually do for the end of a financial year to conduct our auditing work, we have been auditing government's covid-19 initiatives as the money is being spent.

What this means is that we are auditing payments, procurement and delivery of the relief package as they occur, and bringing any audit **findings and observations** directly to the attention of the relevant accounting officers and authorities so that they can deal with shortcomings immediately and tighten controls to prevent a recurrence.



By **findings**, we mean non-compliance with legislation, financial losses, misstatement of information, overpayments, incorrect payments, payments made for goods and services not received, and so on.

By **observations**, we mean weaknesses in controls and processes. These weaknesses either create a risk of fraud, abuse or error, or put the intended delivery of relief initiatives at risk.

Other characteristics that make this audit unique are:

Composition of our audit teams: Our financial auditors are working closely with forensic auditors, information technology specialists and sector-specific experts with deep insight of the risks and operations of the organisations we are auditing. These experts include supply chain audit specialists who analyse payments to suppliers and evaluate high-risk contracts, data and fraud specialists who interrogate grant applications and payment data, and health professionals to unpack risks and challenges around the delivery of personal protective equipment (PPE) and ventilators, as well as the construction of quarantine sites and temporary health facilities.

Collaboration with investigating agencies: On 23 July 2020, President Ramaphosa established a ‘fusion centre’ to investigate fraud and corruption related to government’s covid-19 initiatives. We share our findings and data analyses with the members of the fusion centre, consisting of the Financial Intelligence Centre, Independent Police Investigative Directorate, National Prosecuting Authority, South African Police Service (Crime Investigations and Detective Services), Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (Hawks), South African Revenue Service (Sars), Special Investigating Unit, State Security Agency and National Intelligence Coordinating Committee. We have also been liaising with the Competition Commission and the Public Protector.

Special reports to oversight structures: As we go along, we issue special reports to communicate the outcome of our audit to the oversight structures. Our first *Special report on the financial management of government’s covid-19 initiatives* was tabled on 2 September 2020. For our second report, tabled on 9 December 2020, we continued to follow the money while following up on the progress role players had made in implementing the actions to which they had committed.

While the first two special reports were on provincial and national government initiatives, the third report, due out in mid-2021, will focus on local government.

In the next section, we take a closer look at what we have been auditing and why.

TARGETING HIGH-RISK, HIGH-IMPACT INITIATIVES

Government's R500 billion relief package encompassed a wide range of covid-19 initiatives involving different national, provincial and local government entities.

In our real-time audit, our priority has been to focus on initiatives according to their importance, impact on the overall relief effort, and level of risk for the mismanagement of funds.

We started out by identifying R149,06 billion in potential high-impact, high-risk transactions, payments, procurement and processes, spread across **16 initiatives**. Of this, R135,92 billion was part of the R500 billion relief package and R11,49 billion was from other sources, mainly reprioritised government grants and budgets.

We focused on the following covid-19 initiatives:



Support to vulnerable households

R41 068 billion from the main R500-billion package for social-relief-of-distress grants, top-up grants and food parcel distribution through the South African Social Security Agency (Sassa).



Wage protection

R40 billion for temporary employee/employer relief scheme (Ters) benefits for employees and employers forced to close partly or completely because of covid-19. The responsible government entity is the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF).



Support to small businesses

R1 764 billion for small, medium and micro-enterprises in financial distress. The government entities responsible are the Department of Small Business Development, Small Enterprise Finance Agency and Small Enterprise Development Agency.



Farmers' relief

R764 million for small-scale farmers in financial distress. The entities responsible are the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development and the Agricultural Land Holding Account.



Loans for companies in distress

R2,5 billion for loans from the Industrial Development Corporation.





Sport, arts and culture social relief fund

R235 million to support qualifying artists, athletes and technical persons in the sector. This is the responsibility of the Department of Sport, Arts and Culture; and was made available from additional funds.



Tourism relief fund

R200 million to support qualifying small businesses in the tourism and hospitality sectors. The Department of Tourism and South African Tourism are the responsible parties.



Compensation for occupationally incurred covid-19

No specific amount was allocated and payments, when made, would come from additional funding. The Compensation Fund is responsible.



Healthcare services

R22 420 billion to provide PPE at healthcare facilities, conduct covid-19 testing, and commission field hospitals. The parties responsible are the national and provincial health departments and the National Health Laboratory Services.



Support to municipalities

R23 937 billion for emergency water supply, sanitation, food, shelter for the homeless, community services and basic services for indigent people in metros, district municipalities and local municipalities.



Defence frontline services

R4 297 billion for the deployment of soldiers, enforcement and implementation of lockdown measures, repatriation efforts, and procurement. This is the responsibility of the Department of Defence.



Basic education interventions

R5 862 billion for PPE for learners, educators and support staff, and emergency water supply and sanitation for selected public schools. The national and provincial education departments and Rand Water are responsible.



Quarantine sites

R3 122 billion to identify and provide properties as quarantine and self-isolation sites. The responsible entities are national and provincial departments of public works and the Property Management Trading Entity.



Expanded public works programme

R771 million to employ 25 000 workers for screening, testing and educational campaigns. The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure and the Independent Development Trust are responsible for this.



Emergency supply of water

Additional funding of R506,53 million for water tanks and water tankering services in selected communities. This is the responsibility of the Department of Water and Sanitation, Rand Water and the other water boards.



Temporary residential units

R872 million for the temporary resettlement of people living in overcrowded informal settlements. The responsibility for this lies with national and provincial departments of human settlement, metros and local municipalities, and the Housing Development Agency.

SOME KEY FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

In a period of great uncertainty, when quick decisions have had to be made on the information available at the time, government's covid-19 response has delivered some important results.

Millions of vulnerable households were supported through grants, while unemployed people and businesses that struggled to continue during the lockdown period received funding to keep them afloat.

The relief package also enabled the provision of additional hospital beds, medical equipment, medicines and quarantine sites, as well as community screening, testing and awareness programmes. Furthermore, it paid for PPE for health facilities, schools and frontline workers, and for the emergency supply of water to communities and schools.

That said, our audit found some serious shortcomings in the financial management of government's covid-19 initiatives.

The covid-19 relief package was, as mentioned earlier, introduced into an already compromised control environment, often characterised by poor financial management and record keeping, inadequate planning,



execution without oversight, leadership instability, lack of coordination across government, and poor relations between government departments.

The pandemic has amplified and aggravated these weaknesses.

Slow progress in getting initiatives off the ground

One of the resulting shortcomings has been the very slow progress made with some of the initiatives.

For example:



Despite the fast-tracked and streamlined procurement processes put in place, less than half of the R140,06 billion in our audit had been spent by 31 August 2020. This increased to around 65% by 30 September 2020.



While over R1,7 billion had been made available for support to small businesses, only R308,7 million had been spent by 30 September 2020.



Similarly, only R97 million of the R771 million earmarked for the expanded public works programme had been spent by the same date.



Payments from the sport, arts and culture fund were also painfully slow. Only 34% of the money budgeted had been paid out by the end of September 2020 to athletes, artists and others in the sector who had been unable to work.

Over and above the slow progress made in these and other covid-19 initiatives, our audit teams picked up inefficiencies, quality concerns and financial losses, along with signs of overpricing, unfair processes, the sidestepping of supply chain management legislation as well as abuse and potential fraud.

Inefficiencies and the silo effect

Government departments tend to operate in silos and this has become glaringly obvious during the covid-19 pandemic.

Although the information technology systems across government carry data on almost everyone in the country, this data is not integrated and shared.

For example, Home Affairs has data on identity numbers and deceased people, while Sars has data on taxpayers' earnings. Such information could have been invaluable to the UIF and Sassa in checking if people applying for social grants and other benefits actually qualify for these.

Instead, the lack of validation, integration and sharing of data across government platforms resulted in people, including government officials, receiving benefits and grants to which they were not entitled. On the other hand, applicants who were eligible were unfairly rejected as a result of outdated information.

Poor record keeping is rife

Across many of government's covid-19 initiatives, poor record keeping is a common feature. Auditees do not always have updated or reliable information on the goods and services delivered and initiatives implemented, which in turn makes it difficult for us to audit these matters.

Here are some of the initiatives where we identified inadequate record keeping:



The relief scheme for small-scale farmers, where the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development could not provide sufficient records and reconciliations of the vouchers it had distributed to farmers.



The emergency water supply programme, where the Department of Water Affairs and Sanitation was unable to provide a reliable listing of all water tanks delivered and their location.



The field hospitals programme, where there were delays in providing us with requested information and documentation.



The expanded public works programme, where the Independent Development Trust is the implementing agent. Here, we are seeing the same poor record keeping – and potential fraud risks – that we have been reporting on for a number of years.

Quality concerns crop up

Poor-quality medical supplies, food and construction jeopardise the success of the covid-19 initiatives and can have an adverse impact on the health and well-being of citizens.

Problems with PPE quality and delivery contributed to the delayed reopening of schools. At a number of the schools we visited, the masks provided were not to specification and often one-size-fits-all – whether for a child or an adult.

Some suppliers delivered PPE that did not meet the required specifications or was not what they had been contracted to deliver, or they under-delivered or delivered late. Despite this, most of the departments still paid the suppliers. Poor contract management and significant deficiencies in the ordering, delivery, receipt and payment processes further exposed the health and education sectors to financial loss and resulted in health workers and schools not always receiving the PPE they required.

Emergency water supply was another life-protecting initiative that was plagued by quality issues, as well as delivery delays.

When our audit teams visited a selection of communities and schools to determine whether the water tanks and tankering services paid for were in place, we found various anomalies:




A large proportion of the schools that received water tanks did not need them and some schools that received water tanks were not on the original project list.



We could not find some of the tanks at the locations specified in the registers and there are unconfirmed claims that the tanks were moved by municipalities. At some of the sites we found tanks that were empty and tanks with poor-quality installations.



 We identified instances of non-compliance with legislation in the procurement processes followed by Rand Water, as well as indications of unfairness in the appointment processes.

Signs of overpricing, unfair processes and potential fraud

The already compromised control environment in many government entities, coupled with the need to respond urgently to the covid-19 pandemic, has heightened the risks of public resources being abused or misused. The risk of fraud looms particularly large in procurement and contract management processes, as well as in the approval and payment of social grants and benefits.

We therefore conducted fraud-risk assessments on all the initiatives included in our audit, with the aim of identifying fraud schemes, irregularities, possible implicated service providers and other fraud-risk indicators.

Some of the indicators alerting us to the possibility of fraud are:



Exorbitant spending against suppliers compared to pre-pandemic spending



Suppliers used for the first time during the covid-19 period



Bank account numbers that differ from the details on government's Central Supplier Database



Large round payments made to suppliers



Payments processed through sundry payments

Here are just a few of our findings in this regard:

- **Overpricing:** Our analyses of PPE orders placed by health departments revealed that some items were priced at more than double and even five times the price prescribed by the National Treasury.
- **Double-dipping:** The UIF paid R141 million to 35 043 applicants who were already receiving benefits from other state organisations. This included R41 million paid to people who had government salary reference numbers and R327 638 to people already being paid by the South African National Defence Force.
- **Payments to ineligible social grant beneficiaries:** As at 31 August 2020, we had identified 67 770 social grant recipients who were not eligible for grants as they were employed in government or had income from other sources, including other social grants, UIF payments, or bursaries from the National Student Financial Aid Scheme. We also reported 1 513 beneficiaries who are directors of companies that have government contracts.
- **Supplier anomalies:** We identified a host of irregularities around the appointment of suppliers, including suppliers not having valid tax clearance certificates. Quotation and competitive bidding processes were not always followed and there were reports of conflicts of interest in some supplier appointments.

Most of these shortcomings were identified in the first phase of our audit and included in our first special report, which also contained our recommendations on what needed to be done to address our findings and observations.

In the next section, we focus on how accounting officers and authorities as well as oversight bodies have responded to the concerns we have raised.

HOW GOVERNMENT HAS RESPONDED

The response to the first special report was very positive. Inside and outside government, there was appreciation for the real-time audit approach we followed and the fact that we were able to report comprehensively on the use of covid-19 funds within four months of the fiscal relief package being announced.

As and when we picked up findings or made observations, we immediately alerted the accounting officers or authorities of auditees we were auditing so that they could take corrective action.

We also engaged with all the affected ministers and members of the executive council on the findings and observations in the first report to which they should pay attention. We found them to be committed and ready to do what is necessary for the covid-19 initiatives to succeed and to support the accounting officers and authorities to address the identified shortcomings.

We did not have an opportunity to brief all the portfolio and public accounts committees in Parliament and provincial legislatures. We have, however, taken note of the actions these oversight structures have taken to call accounting officers and executive authorities to account for the management of the funds entrusted to them.

We briefed the fusion centre within a week of tabling the first special report, providing findings, information and data. We also held workshops to support the centre's process of identifying exceptions and irregularities highlighted through the covid-19 audit that warrant criminal investigation and law-enforcement interventions.

Actions speak louder than words

More important than words, of course, is action. Most accounting officers and authorities of auditees where we reported shortcomings in controls and processes or matters that required investigation, resolved to take action.

In total, 37% of these auditees implemented all the actions they committed to when the first special report was issued. The remainder have at least partially implemented the commitments since we engaged them in August 2020.

However, the impact of these actions will not yet be fully apparent as most of the transactions we reported on in our second report took place before the committed actions were implemented.

As it is important to see that concrete action is taken in response to our audit findings and observations, here is a snapshot of some of the corrections made across the 16 initiatives in our audit so far.

Payment of Ters benefits

Before: In the first special report, we reported on various incorrect Ters payments made and flagged a high number of payments that required further investigation.

After: By 20 October 2020, the UIF had recovered about R3,4 billion that had been paid out incorrectly.



Payment of the R350 social-relief-of-distress grant and top-up grant

Before: In our first special report, we stated that Sassa's outdated, limited databases and inadequate verification controls resulted in people who were not in distress receiving the social-relief-of-distress grant, while those who were in distress were sometimes unfairly rejected.

After: Sassa stopped the payment of grants to the individuals we flagged who could also be receiving income from other sources until they can prove that they are entitled to the grant. The agency has advised us that it is investigating all these cases and planning to recover the money paid.

Farmers' relief

Before: In the first special report, we raised concerns about the fairness of the application process and the selection of the suppliers used to redeem vouchers, as well as inadequate record keeping and voucher reconciliation.

After: The Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development is re-evaluating all rejected applications based on the report. However, in some instances the commitments made to address the weaknesses we identified were not adequately and timeously implemented.

Sport, arts and culture social relief fund

Before: In the first special report, we reported that the criteria used to evaluate applications were not specific enough to prevent payments to people with other sources of income, including relief from other funds.

After: The criteria were subsequently clarified, but there were no mechanisms in place to prevent such payments from being made. In the second special report, we identified 286 beneficiaries of the fund who potentially also benefitted from Ters benefits, the social-relief-of-distress grant and government pensions, or who were government employees.

Tourism relief fund

Before: In the first special report, we reported on the risks created by amendments to the original criteria and process for determining which applicants qualify for relief, inadequate review processes, and the potential for human error.

After: In auditing the application, approval and payment processes, we determined that these risks had materialised. The Department of Tourism could not provide us with the supporting documents for some of the approved applications, and we identified weaknesses in the verification of the validity of the supporting documents and in the review processes.

Quarantine sites

Before: In our first special report, we stated that controls were inadequate to maintain records for all quarantine-related transactions and to prevent overpayments. Coordination and accountability at sector level also had to be enhanced.

After: The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure enhanced controls around record keeping. This included tracking covid-19 expenditure, maintaining Department of Health compliance certificates, and improving security controls around data (such as the integrity of Excel databases of quarantine sites). Public Works also incorporated a requirement for dietary needs and occupant identity numbers to be used during invoicing in the new service-level agreement to prevent overpayments and non-adherence to prescribed rates.

Distribution of food parcels

Before: In our first special report, we stated that the distribution process could have been significantly cheaper if Sassa had used the non-profit organisations used by the Department of Social Development instead of appointing service providers.

After: Sassa undertook to investigate the indicators we found of collusive bidding. It has cancelled the appointment process and will not continue with this relief in future.

PPE

Before: In the first special report, we reported on the worrying picture emerging on overpricing, unfair processes, potential fraud, and sidestepping of supply chain management legislation. We also reported on delays in the delivery of PPE and on quality concerns that could have been avoided through better planning and management of suppliers.

After: Accounting officers across the country either have already implemented the actions to which they committed or are in the process of doing so. It will also take time to correct the systemic and deeply rooted problems we have been reporting on for many years.

Expanded public works programme

Before: There were delays in deploying the 25 000 participants who were supposed to have been recruited for the programme.

After: The agreements between the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, the Independent Development Trust and the non-profit organisations responsible for implementation were strengthened. Even so, we again identified that the participants did not receive adequate monitoring and training, that some lacked the PPE they required, and that there were delays in the payment of some participants' wages.



Defence frontline services

Before: We identified shortcomings in the Department of Defence’s planning, procurement, transportation, warehousing and recording of medicines – in particular the procurement and import of an unregistered medical drug from Cuba. Approximately 40% of the vials were exposed to temperature variations that could have compromised the integrity of the drug.

After: The department has commissioned an investigation into this matter.

While it is commendable that most government institutions are taking action to address our audit findings and observations, the fact remains that some of the problems we identified are systemic and require concerted, broad-based and longer-term action across government.

This is discussed in the next section of this report, as part of the discussion on next steps.

NEXT STEPS IN OUR COVID-19 AUDIT

Our work in tracking the money spent on government’s covid-19 initiatives is not yet over. Following on our second special report, we intend releasing a final special report in mid-2021. This report will have a local government focus, bearing in mind that R23,94 billion was allocated to support covid-19 relief efforts in South Africa’s 257 municipalities.

In November 2020, we began auditing the covid-19 spending of 43 municipalities that received large amounts of funding and have a high-risk profile. In these audits, our focus is on testing whether the municipalities concerned had preventative controls in place to address the risks. We are also looking at whether the municipalities used the money provided for its intended purpose and spent it in compliance with the law.

We will report on the outcome of these 43 audits in the final special report.

As for the remaining 214 municipalities, their use of covid-19 funding will be audited as part of our normal municipal audits for 2019-20 and 2020-21.

The local government part of the covid-19 audit is not the only task that still needs to be completed. We will also continue to follow up on the progress government departments and agencies have made in addressing our audit findings and observations reported on in the first two special reports. This will be done as part of our normal annual audit, and will include identifying material irregularities that occurred in the spending of government’s covid-19 relief package.

CONCLUSION

This has been a unique and challenging audit, conducted at a time when South Africa was in lockdown and the safety of our staff and auditees had to come first. We faced many limitations in gathering the information we needed.

The offices of auditees were often closed as a result of covid-19 outbreaks, which affected the flow of information between auditees and auditors. Many of the officials we work with are also on the frontline of the fight against the virus, which made it difficult for them to respond to and support the audit in a timeous manner.

Access to documentation, systems and officials was limited, but we partnered with auditees in putting protocols in place for sharing hard-copy documentation. We also used technology to overcome some of these challenges; many a meeting was held online and we found ways to share data and documents electronically.

This audit was conducted in partnership with auditees, who for the most part, supported our efforts, heeded our recommendations, committed themselves to corrective action, and followed through on the commitments made. Some even took disciplinary steps.

We have observed that where officials, leaders, sectors, implementing agents and institutions do their part and actively partner to strengthen the delivery value chain, they enhance the effectiveness of initiatives and reduce the risk of financial losses, non-delivery, fraud and abuse. We hope that the lessons learnt from the covid-19 audit will empower accounting officers and authorities to tighten controls and ensure that public resources are properly spent and accounted for.

We have for many years been reporting on and warning about poor financial management controls and systems in government. We have also repeatedly identified shortcomings in government's information technology systems, processes and controls. During the covid-19 audit, we again identified such deficiencies, resulting in a lack of validation, integration and sharing of data across government offices.

It is clear that the public sector requires longer term solutions to deal with the underlying causes of people, systems and processes not delivering optimally. Our special reports on government's covid-19 initiatives provide an opportunity for the public sector to learn from what played out during the pandemic and use it to strengthen government's service offerings to the citizens of the country.



FIRST AND SECOND SPECIAL REPORTS


on the financial management of government's covid-19 initiatives



SCAN this QR code to get quick access to the digital version of the First Special Report on the Financial Management of Government's Covid-19 Initiatives.



SCAN this QR code to get quick access to the digital version of the Second Special Report on the financial management of government's covid-19 initiatives



WAYS FOR CITIZENS TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY

When government spending is irregular, unauthorised or fruitless and wasteful, it is citizens' tax money that is being misused.

If you – as a taxpaying citizen of South Africa – are unhappy with the way any government department or public entity is spending public funds, you have the right and the power to speak up and demand accountability to ensure that public funds are utilised responsibly.

Here are a few suggestions about what you can do:



Attend and ask questions during Parliament's public meetings such as Taking Parliament to the People (TPPTP). TPPTP is run by the National Council of Provinces and is held in a different province every year. It includes public meetings where citizens can talk about their experiences of government service delivery and related matters.




Get involved in provincial legislature meetings where discussions on provincial strategic plans, annual performance plans, budgets and annual reports take place.



Write petition letters requesting the legislature in your province to ensure that the provincial departments spend public money properly and that action is taken against those who do not. Each provincial legislature has a petitions office that receives and processes petition letters from members of the public.



Participate at local government level by attending ward committee meetings.



Participate in civil society or community-based organisations' meetings.



Participate in the integrated development plan consultation meetings in your region and engage with your municipality's leadership on service delivery issues and infrastructure developments and service delivery plans for your ward.



WHY SHOULD YOU #ChooseAGSA



Purpose

Being part of AGSA means a unique and rewarding opportunity to contribute towards improving the lives of ordinary citizens through auditing.

Exposure

Some of our auditees that provide great exposure include SKA-SA Project, The Public Investment Corporation, CSIR, Development Bank of SA.

Studies and Mentorship

The AGSA grants bursaries to its trainees studying CTA, ITC & APC. This includes study support, study leave to extra classes.

Paid well

We offer a market-related salary to our TAs and full-time employees.

Involvement

Through various forums, all AGSA employees contribute to the decision-making and achieving the strategy of the organisation.

Retention

We have many opportunities for retention and for growth within the different ranks of the organisation.

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